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FOURTH AMENDMENT-AN
ACCEPTABLE EROSION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Murray v. United States,1 the Supreme Court substantially ex-
panded the independent source doctrine.2 The Court held that
"the Fourth Amendment 3 does not require the suppression of evi-
dence initially discovered during police officers' illegal entry of pri-
vate premises, if the evidence is also discovered during a later
search pursuant to a valid warrant that is wholly independent of the
initial illegal entry.' 4 By allowing the admission of evidence first
discovered during a warrantless search, the Court further eroded
the exclusionary rule.5
This Note argues that despite the erosion permitted in Murray,
there still remains sufficient deterrence against unlawful searches,
provided that independence between the unlawful search and the
lawful seizure is required. This Note further argues that in order to
ensure genuine independence, a requirement of "demonstrated his-
torical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment" need not
be met. Instead, the Court should also look to the circumstances
surrounding the unlawful search, and the good faith of the officers
conducting the unlawful search.
1 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
2 "The 'independent source' doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially
discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained inde-
pendently from lawful activities untainted by the initial illegality." Id. at 2531 (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). See infra notes 25-44
and accompanying text.
S The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
4 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2531.
5 The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence seized during an un-




A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence
seized during an unlawful search. The Court first announced this
doctrine in Weeks v. United States.6 There, a United States Marshall
seized letters and correspondence belonging to the defendant dur-
ing a warrantless search of the defendant's house.7 The trial court
overruled the defendant's objection that the papers should not be
admitted as evidence because they had been obtained without a
search warrant.8 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fed-
eral courts cannot retain for purposes of evidence items seized dur-
ing an unlawful search.9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court said
that while "the efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment [are] praiseworthy.., they are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of en-
deavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land."' 0
The Court originally held the exclusionary rule to be only a fed-
eral remedy. In Wolf v. Colorado,1 I the Court held that the exclusion-
ary rule created in Weeks is not imposed upon the states by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 2 Justice Black, in a
concurring opinion, stated that he agreed "with what appears to be
a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusion-
ary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judi-
cially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."' 3
However, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that all evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of the United States
Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court. 14
6 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7 Id. at 388-89.
8 Id. at 389.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 393.
11 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12 Id. at 33. The fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp was convicted of possession of lewd and lascivious
materials in violation of § 2905.34 of Ohio's Revised Code. Id. The Supreme Court of
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Wolf was expressly overruled to the extent that it held to the con-
trary.1 5 The Court rejected its prior conclusion in Wolfthat the ex-
clusionary rule is a matter of judicial interpretation.1 6 Instead, the
Court in Mapp concluded that the exclusionary rule is implicit in the
Constitution.1 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Clark stated that
"[the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the States
by the Due Process Clause.""'
In addition to evidence directly obtained from an unlawful
search, the Court has also applied the exclusionary rule to derivative
evidence that is the product of the primary evidence or that is other-
wise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search. In Nardone
v. United States,19 the unlawful entry consisted of tapping wires and
eavesdropping on conversations. The Court held that not only was
the evidence obtained directly from the wiretapping inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule, but "any evidence procured from the
knowledge gained from such conversations" must also be
excluded. 20
The Court further extended the exclusionary rule in Silverman v.
United States2' to include testimony regarding information learned
during an unlawful entry. There, the petitioners objected to the ad-
mission of testimony of police officers describing incriminating con-
versations, which the officers had overheard by means of an
electronic listening device.22 The Court determined that because
the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an "unauthorized
Ohio affirmed her conviction, despite the fact that the evidence was unlawfully seized
during a warrantless search of Mapp's home. Id. That court, citing Wolf, found that
even if the search was made without a valid warrant, the unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence may still be used at trial. Id. at 645. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
Id. at 660.
15 Id. at 643.
16 Id. at 655.
17 Id. at 657.
18 Id. at 651.
19 308 U.S. 338 (1939). In Nardone, law enforcement officials unlawfully intercepted
telephone messages in violation of the Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 339. The
trial judge held that the telephone messages themselves were inadmissible, but refused
to allow the defense to examine the prosecution as to how it used the information. Id.
The appellate court affirmed. Nardone v. United States, 106 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1939). The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prosecution was not free to make use of un-
lawfully seized evidence. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 338.
20 Nardone 308 U.S. at 338.
21 365 U.S. 506 (1961).
22 Id. at 505. Police officers utilized a microphone which was pushed through the
party wall of an adjoining building until it touched the heating ducts in the house occu-
pied by the defendants. Id. at 506. The heating ducts conducted the sound, enabling
the officers to overhear conversations which took place throughout the house. Id. at
1988] 649
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physical penetration into the premises," it violated the petitioner's
rights under the fourth amendment.23 Therefore, the Court ruled
that testimony describing conversations unlawfully overheard
should not be admitted into evidence. 24
In sum, the exclusionary rule is a federal remedy that prohibits
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment. The doctrine may be invoked to exclude tangible evi-
dence seized during a warrantless search. In addition, the rule may
be applied to evidence which is an indirect product of unlawful ac-
tivity, as well as testimony concerning knowledge acquired during
an illegal search. Despite the seemingly broad scope of the exclu-
sionary rule, the Court has developed some exceptions. In certain
circumstances, police conduct in violation of the fourth amendment
will not operate to exclude all evidence eventually obtained.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
1. The Independent Source Doctrine
Shortly after the development of the exclusionary rule, the
Court created the independent source doctrine in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States.25 This exception permits the introduction of evi-
dence initially discovered during, or as the consequence of, an un-
lawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful
activities untainted by the initial illegality. 26 In Silverthorne Lumber,
the Court concluded that "illegal action of subordinate public offi-
cials can not forever prevent the United States from securing by
legal process relevant evidence of a violation of its laws."' 27 Further-
more, facts illegally obtained as a result of a fourth amendment vio-
lation do not become "sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like
any others .... "28
The test to be applied to the independent source doctrine was
articulated by the Court in Wong Sun v. United States.29 The Court
rejected a "but for" test, finding that it was not necessary to con-
clude that the evidence would not have come to light "but for" the
507. The trial judge permitted the police officers to describe these conversations, and
the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 506.
23 Id. at 509-10.
24 Id. at 512.
25 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
26 Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2531 (1988).
27 Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 389.
28 Id. at 392.
29 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of Wong Sun.
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unlawful police conduct.30 Instead, the Court concluded that the
more apt question was "whether, granting establishment of the pri-
mary illegality, the evidence to which.., objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."3 1
The Court recently invoked the independent source exception
in Segura v. United States.3 2 There, the Court held that when there is
an independent source for the challenged evidence, it is irrelevant
whether an earlier entry was illegal.33 As long as the information
upon which the warrant was secured is wholly unconnected with the
prior entry, the exclusionary rule does not mandate suppression of
evidence later obtained.3 4' In Segura, the petitioner was arrested in
the lobby of his apartment building.3 5 The agents took the peti-
tioner upstairs to his apartment, entered the apartment, and con-
ducted a limited security check of the premises. 36 Various drug
paraphernalia were observed in plain view.37 The agents then se-
cured the apartment, and two agents remained inside the apartment
while others left to obtain a warrant.38 Nineteen hours later, agents
returned with a valid warrant and searched the premises. 39 The
agents discovered almost three pounds of cocaine and records of
narcotics transactions. 40
The petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that
30 Id. at 487-88.
31 Id. at 488 (citing MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
32 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
33 Id. at 799.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 800. More than one month prior to the arrest, agents of the Drug Enforce-
ment Task Force received information indicating that petitioners were engaged in co-
caine trafficking from their New York apartment. Id. at 799. Based on this information,
the agents maintained a constant surveillance over petitioners until the day of their
arrest. Id. Then, earlier during the day of Segura's arrest, the agents arrested one
Rivudalla-Vidal, who admitted that he had purchased cocaine from petitioner Segura.
Id. at 800. Segura's arrest ensued. Id.
36 Id. at 800-01. The agents conducted the security check in order to ensure that no
one else was there who might pose a threat to their safety or destroy evidence. Id. at
801.
37 Id. at 801. "[Ithe agents observed, in a bedroom in plain view, a triple-beam
scale, jars of lactose, and numerous small cellophane bags, all accouterments of drug
trafficking." Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. The unusually long delay between the initial search and the warranted search
resulted from the fact that the agents arrived at the petitioners' apartment in the evening
(thus, a warrant could not be obtained until the following day) and also from what was
described as "administrative delay." Id.
40 Id. The agents also digcovered eighteen rounds of ,38 caliber ammunition and
more than $50,000 in cash. Id.
1988]
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it was the product of an unlawful search.4' The district court
granted the petitioners' motion, holding that both the drug para-
phernalia observed in plain view as well as the evidence seized
under the valid warrant must be suppressed. 42 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
finding that the paraphernalia discovered during the initial warrant-
less entry was properly excluded, but the exclusionary rule did not
require suppression of evidence seized as a result of the valid war-
rant because that evidence was procured pursuant to an independ-
ent source.43 The Supreme Court affirmed, 44 thus validating the
independent source doctrine as applied to evidence discovered for
the first time pursuant to an independent, lawful source, regardless
of a prior fourth amendment violation.
2. The Attenuated Basis Exception
A second exception to the exclusionary rule was developed by
the Court in Nardone.45 Under the attenuated basis exception, the
exclusionary rule does not apply where the connection between the
fourth amendment violation and the acquisition of the challenged
evidence is very remote.46 The Court, citing Silverthorne Lumber, re-
peated that even though facts may be improperly obtained, they do
not necessarily become "sacred and inaccessible." 47 The Court
went on to state that the connection between the improper act and
the challenged evidence, "may have become so attenuated as to dis-
sipate the taint." 48 In such situations, the evidence may be properly
admitted.
The attenuated basis exception was affirmed by the Court in
Wong Sun.49 In analyzing petitioner's challenge to the evidence, the
41 Id.
42 Id. at 801-02. The court ruled that there were "no exigent circumstances justify-
ing the initial entry into the apartment." Id. at 802. Therefore, the seizure of the drugs
and paraphernalia was illegal, and the evidence must thereby be suppressed as "'fruits'
of illegal searches." Id. See infra note 46 for the origin of the term "fruits" as used by
the Court.
43 Id. at 802-03.
44 Id. at 804.
45 308 U.S. 338. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for discussion of the facts
of Nardone.
46 Id. at 341. In Nardone, evidence was procured from unlawful wiretapping. Id. at
339. The Court held that first, the accused has the burden of proving that the wiretap-
ping was unlawfully employed. Then, once that is established, the accused must be
given the opportunity to prove that "a substantial portion of the case against him was a
fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 341.
47 Id. (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
48 Id. at 341.
49 371 U.S. 471. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Court reaffirmed that the exclusionary rule will not apply to cases in
which the government "learned of the evidence 'from an independ-
ent source,'"50 or in which "the connection between the lawless
conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence
has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' "51
3. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
A final exception to the exclusionary rule was recently articu-
lated by the Court in Nix v. Williams.52 The inevitable discovery ex-
ception permits the introduction of evidence that would ultimately
or "inevitably have been discovered wothout reference to the police
error or misconduct."153 In Nix, the Court permitted the admission
of evidence obtained pursuant to a police officer's questioning of
the defendant in violation of his sixth amendment 54 right to coun-
sel.55 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
50 Id. at 487. (quoting Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392).
51 Id. (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). After an unlawful arrest, Wong Sun was
lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance. Id. at 491. Several days later
he voluntarily returned and made an unsigned statement. Id. The Court held that the
unsigned statement was properly admitted into evidence because the connection be-
tween his unlawful arrest and the making of the unsigned statement was so attenuated
that the making of the statement was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest. Id.
52 467 U.S. 431 (1984). In Nix, the evidence was held to be admissible despite unlaw-
ful questioning of the defendant. Id. Shortly after the disappearance of a ten year old
girl from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa, over two hundred volunteers began searching
the area for the child. Id. at 434-35. Meanwhile, Williams was arrested in Davenport,
Iowa in connection with the girl's disappearance. Id. at 435. The police officers told
Williams' attorney that they would drive Williams back to Des Moines without question-
ing him. Id. However, during the trip, one of the police officers began a conversation
with Williams which ultimately resulted in Williams directing the police officers to the
body. Id. at 435-36. The search was called off when Williams took police to the body.
Id. at 436.
53 Id. at 432.
54 The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartialjury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55 Nix, 467 U.S. at 431. The police officer's unlawful questioning of Williams is often
referred to as the "Christian Burial Speech." During the trip to Des Moines, one of the
officers said to Williams:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road....
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself
are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ... and if you get a
snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going
right past the area [where the body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled
to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christ-
1988]
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there was no reason to exclude the evidence because an independ-
ent search, already in progress, would have inevitably discovered
the evidence regardless of the police officers' unlawful questioning
of the defendant. 56 Furthermore, the Court concluded that society's
competing interests of deterring unlawful police conduct and having
juries receive all probative evidence of a crime would not be prop-
erly balanced by suppression of the evidence in this case.57 Instead,
the evidence should be admitted because the interests of society are
balanced by putting the police in the same, rather than a worse, po-
sition than they would have been had no police error or misconduct
occurred. 58
Thus, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to police activity in violation of the fourth
amendment. Nevertheless, evidence will not be barred from trial in
every situation in which police misconduct occurs. Instead, even in
the event of unlawful police activity, evidence should be admissible
when: (1) the evidence was obtained pursuant to a lawful search
wholly independent of the initial illegality; (2) the connection be-
tween the challenged evidence and the unlawful act was remote; or
(3) the evidence inevitably would have been discovered regardless
of the official's misconduct.
III. FACTS
On April 6, 1983, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) arrested James D. Carter and Michael F. Murray. 59 Two
weeks later Murray and Carter were charged in a five count indict-
ment for various drug violations. 60 They were subsequently con-
victed of conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(6), and 846.61
The events leading to their indictment began in July, 1982,
when federal agents initiated a spot surveillance of Murray, Carter,
and the other original defendants. 62 Then, early in 1983, the agents
mas [E]ve and murdered .... [A]fter the snowstorm [we may not be] able to find it
at all.
Id. at 435-36.
56 Id. at 448. See supra note 52.
57 Nix, 467 U.S at 432.
58 Id. at 447.
59 United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 591 (Ist Cir. 1985). Also involved in
the conspiracy were John M. Rooney, Christopher Moscattiello, Arthur Barrett and Ste-
phen King ("the other original defendants"). Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 591-92.
62 Id. at 591. See supra note 59. Brief for the United States at 2-3, Murray v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)(Nos. 86-995 and 86-1016).
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received information implicating Murray and Carter in a conspiracy
to possess and distribute illegal drugs.63 This information was cor-
roborated by local law enforcement officials, and by April 6, 1983,
the federal agents believed that a drug transaction was imminent.6
During the early afternoon of April 16, fifteen federal agents
closely monitored Murray, Carter, and the other original defend-
ants.65 The agents observed a truck and a green camper enter a
warehouse in South Boston.66 The vehicles were driven by Murray
and Carter.67 When Murray and Carter drove the vehicles out of
the warehouse about twenty minutes later, the agents saw two indi-
viduals and a tractor trailer carrying a long, dark container inside
the warehouse.68 The agents followed both of the vehicles, and,
shortly thereafter, Murray and Carter turned over the vehicles to
two new drivers. 69 The agents continued to follow the truck and
camper and eventually stopped the vehicles and arrested the driv-
ers.70 The vehicles were lawfully seized and found to contain
marijuana. 71
After the agents learned that the truck and the camper con-
tained marijuana, they converged on the warehouse. 72 The agents
knocked on the door and announced their presence several times,
but received no response. 73 They opened a mail slot and noticed a
63 Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 591.
64 Id.
65 Murray, 108 S. Ct at 2532. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Murray v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)(Nos. 86-995 and 86-1016).
66 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. John Rooney and Christopher Moscatiello were the new drivers of the vehicles.
Brief for the United States at 4, Murray, 108 S. Ct. 2529.
70 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
71 Id. Moscatiello', who was driving the camper, was pulled over on the Massachu-
setts Turnpike. Brief for the United States at 2-3. As one of the agents pulled the
camper to the side of the road, he noticed a burlap covered bale in the camper compart-
ment. Id. He immediately radioed the other agents. Id. Minutes later, Rooney, who
was driving the truck, was pulled over as he backed out of a driveway. Id. at 5. One of
the agents noticed the odor of marijuana, and, using Rooney's keys, opened the rear of
the truck and found sixty bales of marijuana inside. Id. The district court held, and the
appellate court affirmed, that the agents who stopped the vehicles had probable cause to
believe that contraband was being transported. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 596. Therefore,
they were empowered to stop and search the vehicles under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement of the four'th amendment. Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
72 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
73 Id. See also, Brief for the United States at 5 (The agents stated that they walked
around the warehouse several times, looking for windows that would give them a view of
the inside of the building, but they found none). Brief for the United States at 5.
1988] 655
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
strong odor coming from within the warehouse.74 The agents
forced open the door, and several of the agents entered the ware-
house. Inside the warehouse, the agents saw in plain sight numer-
ous burlap wrapped bales, which they suspected contained
marijuana.75 The agents left the bales undisturbed and exited the
warehouse. 76
While some of the agents maintained surveillance over the
warehouse, others began to prepare affidavits in support of warrants
to search the warehouse. 77 The affidavits did not mention the ear-
lier entry, nor any information obtained during that entry.78 In-
stead, the agents relied upon information derived from other FBI
and DEA activities . 9
Before the trial, Murray, Carter, and the other original defend-
ants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warehouse.80
They claimed that the warrant was invalid on the grounds that the
agents did not divulge the earlier entry when applying for the war-
rant, and that the warrant was "tainted" by that entry.81 The district
court denied the petitioners' pretrial motion.82 The First Circuit af-
firmed, holding that even if the initial entry of the warehouse vio-
lated the fourth amendment, the evidence uncovered pursuant to
the second, lawful entry should not be suppressed because such evi-
dence was discovered through an independent, untainted source
and would have been discovered even if the illegality had not oc-
curred.83 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the fourth amendment requires the suppression of evi-
dence initially discovered during an unlawful search of private
premises, if that evidence is also discovered during a later search
pursuant to a valid warrant that is completely independent of the
initial entry.8 4
74 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532. Brief for the United States at 5.
75 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532. Brief for the United States at 6.
76 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
77 Id. Brief for the United States at 6.
78 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
79 Id. at 2536. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Civil Liberties
Union of Massachusetts as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 3, Murray v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)(Nos. 86-995 and 86-1016).
80 Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 591.
81 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
82 Id.
83 Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 604.
84 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532. Murray and Carter filed separate petitions for certio-
rari. Id. The original petitions raised the fourth amendment issue and also a Speedy
Trial Act claim. Id. at 2532 n. 1. The Supreme Court granted and consolidated both of
the petitions, vacated the judgment below and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986). Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1 (citing
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DEciSION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,85 Justice Scalia vacated and remanded
the decision of the court of appeals.8 6 The majority affirmed the
validity of the independent source doctrine,8 7 and held that the
fourth amendment does not require the suppression of evidence ini-
tially discovered during, or as the consequence of, an unlawful
search, but later obtained independently from lawful activities un-
tainted by the initial illegal search.88 However, since the district
court did not explicitly find that the federal agents would have ob-
tained the warrant even if they had not previously entered the ware-
house, the majority held that this case should be remanded in order
to determine the "ultimate question" of whether the second, lawful
search was in fact a genuinely independent source of the evidence.8 9
At the outset, Justice Scalia reviewed the principles of the exclu-
sionary rule.90 In addition to requiring the suppression of evidence
acquired during an illegal search, the rule further requires that any
evidence which stems from the warrantless search must also be sup-
pressed, unless the connection with the illegality is " 'so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.' "91
The Court went on to note that the exclusionary rule is not an
absolute rule to be applied to all situations in which evidence is
seized pursuant to a warrantless search. Justice Scalia said that, in
Silverthorne Lumber,92 the Court first articulated the idependent
source exception to the exclusionary rule.93 Under this doctrine,
evidence which has a source independent from the illegality may be
Carter v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986)). On remand, the appellate court again
rejected the Speedy Trial Act claim and did not reexamine its prior ruling of the fourth
amendment question. 803 F.2d at 20 (1st Cir. 1986). Petitioners again sought writs of
certiorari, which the Court granted limited to the fourth amendment issue. Murray, 108
S. Ct. at 2532 n.l.
85 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun constituted the majority. Justices
Brennan and Kennedy took no part in the consideration or the decision of this case.
Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2531.
86 Id. at 2529.
87 Id. at 2533. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
independent source doctrine.
88 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532-36.
89 Id. at 2536.
90 Id. at 2532-33. For a review of these principles, see supra notes 6-24 and accompa-
nying text.
91 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).
92 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
93 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for a




Justice Scalia then referred to the Court's recent application of
the independent source doctrine in Segura.95 There, he said, the
Court held that evidence uncovered for the first time during an in-
dependent search conducted with a valid warrant need not be sup-
pressed despite a prior, illegal entry.96 Justice Scalia framed the
dispute in Murray as whether the Court should extend the independ-
ent source doctrine to include the admission of evidence which is
first discovered during an illegal search and later "discovered"
again pursuant to a valid warrant. 97 The Court decided this ques-
tion in the affirmative.98
In reaching this decision, Justice Scalia first discussed the origi-
nal use of the independent source doctrine. 99 Justice Scalia noted
that in both Silverthorne Lumber 00 and in United States v. Silvestri,'0
the independent source doctrine was invoked specifically with refer-
ence to "that particular category of evidence acquired by an un-
tainted search which is identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired."'0 2
Justice Scalia, quoting Silverthorne Lumber, stated that " 'of course
this does not mean that the facts thus obtained [from an illegal
source] become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any
others.' ",103 Also, Justice Scalia pointed out that the First Circuit
concluded in Silvestri that, " '[i]n the classic independent source situ-
ation, information which is received through an illegal source is con-
sidered to be cleanly obtained when it arrives through an
independent source.' "104 Thus, based on his reading of these
cases, Justice Scalia concluded that the independent source doctrine
94 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533. Justice Scalia noted that the independent source doc-
trine was recently described as follows:
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest
in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by
putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that [sic] they would have been
in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.... When the challenged evidence
has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a
worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.
Id. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443) (emphasis in original).
95 Id. (citing Segura, 468 U.S. 796). See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Segura.




100 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
101 787 F.2d 736 (st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
102 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533 (emphasis in original).
103 Id. at 2533-34 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392).
104 Id. at 2533-34 (quoting Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 739).
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covers both evidence seized for the first time during a lawful search
as well as evidence discovered for the first time during an unlawful
search and later seized pursuant to a valid warrant. 0 5
Furthermore, the Court concluded that its recent application of
the "inevitable discovery doctrine"' 0 6 affirms that the independent
source doctrine may be invoked even if the evidence in question was
discovered pursuant to a warrantless search.10 7 Nix involved the ap-
plication of the inevitable discovery doctrine in a sixth amendment
context. There, police discovered the challenged evidence after
questioning the defendant in violation of his right to counsel. 08
Nevertheless, the Nix Court held that the evidence was admissible
because a search was already under way that would have inevitably
discovered the evidence regardless of the unlawful questioning.' 0 9
Although the Court in Nix explicitly found the independent source
doctrine to be inapplicable, the Court in Murray concluded that the
inevitable discovery doctrine was "in reality an extrapolation from
the independent source doctrine." 110 Therefore, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that since the inevitable discovery doctrine may be applied to
evidence obtained for the first time through illegal means, the in-
dependent source doctrine should also apply to such evidence."'
The Court then analyzed the effect that such a holding would
have on incentives for law enforcement authorities to conduct un-
lawful searches. 112 Justice Scalia rejected the petitioners' conten-
tion that a failure to exclude evidence which is initially discovered
during an illegal search, but later acquired during an independent,
legal search, would provide a positive incentive to conduct unlawful
105 Id.
106 Justice Scalia was referring to Nix, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See supra notes 52-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Nix.
107 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2534.
108 Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-50. See supra note 55 for the text of the "Christian Burial
Speech."
109 Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-50. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the search for the missing girl.
110 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2534.
111 Id. Justice Scalia stated:
This "inevitable discovery" doctrine obviously assumes the validity of the in-
dependent source doctrine as applied to evidence initially acquired unlawfully. It
would make no sense to admit the evidence because the independent search, had it
not been aborted, would have found the body, but to exclude the evidence if the
search had continued and had in fact found the body. The inevitable discovery
doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the in-
dependent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact
discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably
would have been discovered.




police searches. 1 3 Instead, the Court concluded that incentives to
obtain a valid warrant remain despite such a rule. 14 First, an officer
with probable cause would have no incentive to conduct a warrant-
less search. 1 5 Such an action would be accompanied by the risk of
suppression of all evidence if the officer is unable to convince a trial
judge that the second, lawful search truly constituted an independ-
ent source of the information. 16 Furthermore, according to the
Court, an officer without probable cause would also have no incen-
tive to conduct a warrantless search "since whatever he finds cannot
be used to establish probable cause before a magistrate."' "17
Finally, the Court concluded that there was no basis to distin-
guish between tangible and intangible evidence." t8 The Court ac-
knowledged that the First Circuit made such a distinction, finding
that objects " 'once seized cannot be cleanly reseized without re-
turning the objects to private control.' ,119 However, Justice Scalia
found no merit to this distinction, and instead concluded that
"reseizure of tangible evidence already seized is no more impossible
than rediscovery of intangible evidence already discovered."' 20
In concluding his opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized the impor-
tance of independence, stating that "[tlhe ultimate question . .. is
whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely in-
dependent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue
here."'12' He then noted two situations in which there would be no
genuine independence. First, the search pursuant to the warrant
would not be an independent source of the information if the
"agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they
had seen during the initial entry."' 122 Second, there would be no
independence if information obtained during the warrantless entry
was "presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue
113 Id. Petitioners claim that such a rule would lead to "confirmatory" searches, or
"entries just to make sure that what is expected to be on the premises is in fact there."
Brief for the Petitioners at 42, Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)(Nos. 86-
99 and 86-1016). Petitioners argued that law enforcement officials would be induced to
conduct these searches because they would be able to spare themselves the time and
trouble of getting a warrant if they could later obtain a warrant and use the evidence
despite the unlawful entry. Id.




118 Id. at 2535.
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the warrant."' 123 Justice Scalia noted that the district court found
that the agents did not use any information discovered during the
warrantless entry when they applied for a warrant. 124 However, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that, since the district court did not "explicitly
find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not
earlier entered the warehouse," the case should be remanded for a
determination of whether the second, lawful search was indeed an
independent source of the challenged evidence. 125
Thus, the Court extended the independent source doctrine
from its application in Segura.126 The Court held that the doctrine is
not limited to evidence discovered for the first time during a lawful
search, but instead includes the admissibility of evidence which au-
thorities discovered for the first time during an unlawful search, and
then later seized pursuant to a valid warrant, provided that the sec-
ond search is truly an independent source of the evidence at
issue. 127
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In dissent, Justice Marshall 128 concluded that the majority's in-
terpretation of the independent source doctrine "emasculates the
Warrant Clause and undermines the deterrence function of the ex-
clusionary rule."' 129
At the outset, the dissent set forth the purposes underlying the
exclusionary rule and the independent source exception. 3 0 Relying
upon United States v. Leon,' 31 and Elkins v. United States,' 3 2 Justice
123 Id. at 2535-36.
124 Id. at 2536.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2533. See supra notes 32-44 for a discussion of the Court's application of the
independent source doctrine in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
127 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2531-36.
128 JoiningJustice Marshall in dissent were justices Stevens and O'Connor. 108 S. Ct.
at 2536.
129 Id. at 2536 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2536-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the Court held:
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the
use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in rea-
sonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
but ultimately found to be invalid.... The question whether the exclusionary sanc-
tion is appropriately imposed in a particular case as a judicially created remedy to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect, must be resolved by
weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in
chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
132 364 U.S. 206 (1960). In Elkins, the Court stated that "[t]he [exclusionary] rule is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the con-
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Marshall asserted that the exclusionary rule is primarily designed to
deter violations of the fourth amendment.13 3 Furthermore, he
stated that the independent source and inevitable discovery excep-
tions are "primarily based on a practical view that under certain cir-
cumstances the beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on
future constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost
of excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial."' 34 There-
fore, given this rationale for the independent source doctrine, Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that any application of the doctrine must
involve a balancing of the constitutional violation and the deterrent
effect based on the facts of each case.' 35 Justice Marshall then con-
cluded that the majority's application of the doctrine to the facts of
the instant case "can find no justification in the purposes underlying
both the exclusionary rule and the independent source
exception."1 36
Justice Marshall further explained that the application of the in-
dependent source doctrine in this case not only undermines the de-
terrent function of the exclusionary rule, but also provides positive
incentives for unlawful searches.' 37 Justice Marshall argued that law
enforcement officers will have the incentive to conduct "confirma-
tory" searches.' 3 8 Because it is often time consuming and inconve-
nient to obtain a warrant, he said, law enforcement officials would
conduct an initial, unlawful search in order to determine if it would
be worthwhile to seek a warrant.' 3 9 Only if the officials discover in-
criminating evidence, Justice Marshall asserted, would they later
seek a warrant in order to "shield the evidence from the taint of the
illegal search."' 140
The dissent flatly rejected the majority's interpretation of the
incentives, finding little burden in convincing a trial court that infor-
mation gained from the illegal entry did not affect the decision to
seek a warrant. 14 ' First, Justice Marshall argued, it is easy for the
officers to exclude information obtained from the illegal entry when
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it." Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
'33 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 2537 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444-46; Leon, 468 U.S.
at 906-09).
135 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'37 Id. at 2538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 113 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of "confirmatory" searches.
139 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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seeking the warrant because the officers are in control and posses-
sion of the information. 142 Also, he argued, because the application
of the independent source doctrine hinges on the officers' intent, it
is difficult for a defendant to rebut the officers' assertion that they
always intended to obtain a warrant. 143 Thus, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that "the litigation risk described by the Court seems hardly
a risk at all; it does not significantly dampen the incentive to conduct
the initial illegal search."' 144
Justice Marshall then asserted that the majority opinion failed
to ensure genuine independence.' 45 Relying on Nix, 146 the dissent
stated that the basis for finding that a second search was untainted
by the prior illegal search must focus on " 'demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.' ,,147 Absent
such facts, Justice Marshall argued, "the threat that the subsequent
search was tainted by the illegal search is too great to allow for the
application of the independent source exception."' 148 The major-
ity's holding to the contrary, he said, "lends itself to easy abuse"
and provides incentives to bypass the Constitution.' 49
In conclusion, Justice Marshall asserted that the independent
source doctrine as applied in Segura should not be extended to in-
clude evidence initially discovered during an unlawful search. 150
Such an extension of the doctrine, he said, would eliminate any re-
maining incentives to obtain a warrant prior to entry. 151 Further-
142 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall offered two additional arguments
against an "intent-based" rule. First, he argued that whether the officers intended to
obtain a warrant prior to their initial, illegal entry is of little significance to the "relevant
question: whether, even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence, the officers' [sic]
would return immediately with a warrant to conduct a second search." Id. at 2538 n.2
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that even if the officers had in-
tended to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal search, if the search failed to uncover
contraband, "those same officers might decide their time is better spent than to return
with a warrant." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Marshall argued that an
"intent-based" rule would be difficult to apply, because "[i]ntentions clearly may differ
both among supervisory officers and among officers who initiate the illegal search." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 2538-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Nix.
147 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 445).
In Nix, the "historical facts" were that a volunteer search party was already in progress
that was heading toward the hidden body.
148 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 2540 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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more, he continued, when the evidence is first discovered during a
warrantless search, there is a much greater probability that any sub-
sequent search will be tainted by such evidence. 5 2
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent in concluding
that the majority's decision " 'emasculates the Warrant Clause and
provides an intolerable incentive for warrantless searches.' "153
However, rather than draw a line at Segura as did Justice Marshall,
Justice Stevens remained "convinced that the Segura decision itself
[is] unacceptable" because even that decision "provide[s] govern-
ment agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitu-
tional violations of the privacy of the home."' 154
V. ANALYSIS
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Throughout its history, several justifications for the exlusionary
rule have been offered by the Court. 155 Initially, the Court justified
the rule as a protection of individual rights.' 56 In Weeks, the Court
stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
[unreasonable] searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. ' 5 7
However, the personal rights rationale has been seriously im-
paired in recent years.' 58 In United States v. Calandra,'5 9 the Court
152 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
154 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting)(citing Segura, 468 U.S. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
155 Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 878-79 (1982) [hereinafter "Schlag"].
156 Schlag, supra note 155, at 879. Schlag explains that there are two views of the
individual rights rationale. Id. First, the fourth amendment may be seen as addressed
not only to law enforcement agencies, but to the courts as well. Id. Thus, under this
view, admission of illegally obtained evidence constitutes a continuing or separate
fourth amendment violation. Id. Second, the exclusionary rule may be seen as "the
appropriate means by which an individual asserts the right to judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of law enforcement actions connected to his or her prosecution." Id. (cit-
ing Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 257-60 (1974)).
157 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
158 Schlag, supra note 155, at 879.
159 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 79
INDEPENDENT SOURCE DOCTRINE
expressly rejected this rationale, stating that "the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the
search victim.' 1 6 0 And a similar conclusion was reached in Elkins,
where the Court again rejected the personal rights rationale. 16 1
A second justification for the exclusionary rule is the mainte-
nance of judicial integrity. 162 One commentator has argued:
[T]he judicial branch should not participate in or sanction illegal con-
duct in the administration of the law. Hence, exclusion of tainted evi-
dence is necessary to divorce the judgments of the courts from any
illegal conduct employed in securing evidence and to ensure that judi-
cial decisions in no way defy constitutional prohibitions. 163
The judicial integrity justification has also been offered by the
Court since the origin of the doctrine. In Weeks v. United States, the
Court stated:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures and forced confes-
sions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to un-
warranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal
Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and
to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the mainte-
nance of such fundamental rights. 1 6 4
However, like the personal rights rationale, the judicial integ-
rity justification has been seriously impaired by subsequent deci-
sions and recent criticism. 165 For example, in Stone v. Powell,166 the
Court stated that the "[imperitive] of judicial integrity ... has lim-
ited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evi-
dence."' 167 Also, it has been argued that judicial integrity is harmed
a good deal more when the Court turns a criminal loose to prey
upon society than it does when it affirms a conviction despite a
fourth amendment violation. 168
160 Id. at 347. In rejecting the individual rights rationale, the Court relied upon the
deterrence justification, stating that, "the rule is ajudicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 348. See infra notes 169-76
and accompanying text.
161 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
162 Schlag, supra note 155, at 880.
163 Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 88 (1974). See also, Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394; Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 469-85 (1928)(Brandeis, J. and Holmes, J. dissenting).
164 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
165 Schlag, supra note 155, at 881.
166 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
167 Id. at 485.
168 Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86
MIcH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). Kamisar has developed what he calls a "comparative repre-
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A third justification for the exclusionary rule that has been re-
lied upon by the Court is the deterrence rationale. 169 The Court has
stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "compel re-
spect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."170 The deterrence
rationale was again discussed in United States v. Calandra.'71 There,
the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule is justified because it
has the effect of safeguarding fourth amendment rights by deterring
future unlawful police conduct.' 72
There are two ways in which the exclusionary rule operates to
deter police misconduct. 173 First, the exclusionary rule deters indi-
vidual violations of the fourth amendment by" 'removing the incen-
tive to disregard it.' "174 Thus, a police officer faced with the
decision of whether to unlawfully search premises or wait until a
warrant is obtained would find it advantageous to first obtain a war-
rant because he knows that any evidence discovered during a war-
rantless entry will not be admissible in court. Second, systematic
deterrence is furthered. 175 The exclusionary rule "encourage[s]
those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value system."176
Thus, the rationale that has emerged as the most significant is
the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect. A decision as to whether to
apply the exclusionary rule in a particular situation must be made in
light of the deterrent effects. If exclusion will not result in apprecia-
ble deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted. 177
hensibility test." He argues that "where the defendant's conduct is more reprehensible
than the police officers' (as... it usually will be), the 'judges shouldn't soil their hands'
argument is a good reason for admitting illegally seized evidence." Id. at 2 (emphasis in
original).
169 Schlag;supra note 155, at 881.
170 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
171 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
172 Id. at 347-48.
173 Comment, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 842, 844 (1987).
174 Id. at 844 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976)).
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 492). See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970).
177 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). In Leon, a search of the defend-
ants' residences and automobiles was conducted pursuant to a facially valid search war-
rant issued by a state court judge. Id. at 902. Large quantities of drugs and other
incriminating evidence were seized. Id. However, the district court granted defendants'
motions to suppress the evidence, finding that the affidavits used in obtaining the war-
rant were not sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 903. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. Id. at 904-05. But, the Supreme court reversed, holding that "admitting
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B. THE BALANCING TEST
The Court has adopted a balancing approach for considering
exclusionary rule questions.1 78 The social costs of excluding proba-
tive evidence and thus releasing a clearly guilty defendant must be
weighed against the effect that a failure to exclude evidence would
have upon incentives to conduct future warrantless searches and the
ensuing fourth amendment violations. 179
When the balancing test is applied to the facts of Murray, it is
clear that the Court reached the correct conclusion. First, the result
reached in Murray will not have an appreciable effect on incentives
to conduct unlawful searches. As long as the Court requires genu-
ine independence 80 between the initial unlawful search and the
subsequent lawful seizure, the risk of suppression will continue to
deter law enforcement officials from conducting warrantless
searches.' 8 1
Furthermore, there remain other deterrents against warrantless
searches even in the absence of any exclusionary rule. One signifi-
cant deterrent is public outrage. Law enforcement officials would
hesitate to conduct indiscriminate warrantless searches because this
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the war-
rant was somehow defective will not reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to
comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead
to the granting of all colorable warrant requests." Id. at 898. See also United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). InJanis, the Court also concluded that "[t]he prime, if
not the sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct." Id. at 433. The Court held:
The judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in
the civil proceeding of one sovereign (here the federal government) of evidence
illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign (here the
state government) since the likelihood of deterring law enforcement conduct
through such a rule is not sufficient to outweigh the societal costs imposed by the
exclusion.
Id.
178 Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
179 Id. at 906-08. See alsoJanis, 428 U.S. at 454.
180 See infra notes 203-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of assuring
independence.
181 In his opinion, Justice Scalia stated:
An officer with probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish
to enter the premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk sup-
pression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, since his action
would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable
cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no informa-
tion gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers' deci-
sion to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it .... Nor would the
officer without sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant have any added
incentive to conduct an unlawful entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used to
establish probable cause before a magistrate.
Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2534 (emphasis in original).
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would lead to widespread criticism. This in turn would cause policy
makers to increase restrictions on police conduct. Additionally, ed-
ucation of police officers and departmental sanctions would play a
role in preventing unlawful conduct.' 8 2 In order to avoid criticism
and possible exclusion of probative evidence, police departments
have an incentive to educate officers about the fourth amendment
and impose sanctions against offending officers for their conduct.
Finally, a third potential deterrent is the possibility of private tort
claims. 18 3
Thus, the decision reached by the Court in Murray will not have
the effect of providing incentives to conduct warrantless searches.
Moreover, even in the event that such a search does occur, the social
cost occasioned by the loss of fourth amendment rights is not great.
Cases similar to Murray do not involve situations in which innocent
people are being subjected to random searches. Instead, these
cases involve situations in which probable cause existed before any
search was conducted)18 4
In his dissent in Segura, Justice Stevens argued that such an ap-
plication of the independent source doctrine does involve a signifi-
cant fourth amendment violation because any warrantless search
prevents the defendant from having the opportunity to destroy the
incriminating evidence. 8 5 However, the Court wisely rejected this
182 Mertens and Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregu-
lating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 399-401 (1981). Mertens and
Wasserstrom argue that the threat of the exclusionary rule really does influence police
departments, and through them, individual police officers. Id. at 399. Even if a particu-
lar police officer is indifferent as to whether his or her arrests and seizures result in
actual convictions, the officer's superiors are clearly concerned with successful prosecu-
tions. Id. Furthermore, even if some individual police officers are hostile toward the
fourth amendment, the police department is "not likely to share such a view, at least
officially." Id. Moreover, police officers are in "an excellent position to assimilate"
fourth amndment standards because the fourth amendment "permeates the officers'
day-to-day professional life." Id. Further, "[e]ven if prosecutors cannot always find the
time to explain the Fourth Amendment to the police, many of the larger police depart-
ments hire legal counsel to make legal standards intelligible to the policeman on pa-
trol." Id.
183 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984).
184 As long as independence is required, a police officer without probable cause will
have no incentive to conduct a search without a valid warrant because nothing that he or
she learns during such a search can be used in obtaining a warrant. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at
2534. Therefore, the result reached in Murray should have no effect on the possibility of
innocent people being subjected to random searches.
185 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 833 (1984)(Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens stated that the Court has "regularly invoked the exclusionary rule because the
evidence would have eluded the police absent the illegality." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens further stated that:
The element of access, rather than information, is central to virtually the whole of
our jurisprudence under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. In all of
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argument, stating that the idea that there is a constitutional right to
destroy such evidence "defies both logic and common sense."18 6
On the other side of the equation, the social cost of excluding
probative evidence and releasing obviously guilty criminals is great.
The exclusionary rule "already exacts an enormous price from soci-
ety," 18 7 and any rule which increases this price must be accompa-
nied by significant benefits in the form of deterrence.' 88
Furthermore, the cost of dismissing only one case and releasing an
obviously guilty defendant may be enormous. To the costs of the
crime itself, the wasted efforts of law enforcement officials must also
be added. Moreover, the loss of respect for the judicial system and
the law weakens the disincentive for criminals to commit crimes.' 8 9
C. CAN THE COURT MODIFY OR ELIMINATE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
Even though the Court's decision not to suppress evidence in
Murray passes the balancing test,190 it could be argued that the
Court is not free to alter the exclusionary rule through such excep-
tions as the independent source doctrine. In Mapp v. Ohio,t91 the
Court concluded that "the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredi-
ent of the Fourth Amdendment as the right it embodies is vouch-
safed against the States by the Due Process Clause .... "192 This
holding would seem to leave little room for modification of the ex-
clusionary rule.
our cases suppressing evidence because it was obtained pursuant to a warrantless
search, we have focused not on the authorities' lack of appropriate information to
authorize the search, but rather on the fact that that information was not presented
to a magistrate. Thus, suppression is the consequence not of a lack of information,
but of the fact that the authorities' access to the evidence in question was not prop-
erly authorized and hence was unconstitutional.
Id. at 833 n.27.
186 Id. at 816.
187 Id.
188 Cf. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585 (1983). In a recent empirical study, Nardulli concluded that
the social cost of exclusion is not great because a small percentage of lawsuits are dis-
missed for this reason. Id. Nardulli's study used data collected for 7,500 cases. Id. His
results indicated that successful motions to suppress physical evidence occur in 0.69%
of the cases, and successful motions to suppress identifications or confessions occur in
less than 0.6%o of the cases. Id.
189 This may be especially true because cases involving successful motions to exclude
probative evidence are likely to be publicized.
190 See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing
test.
191 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
192 Id. at 651. Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In wof, Justice
Black concluded that "the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the fourth
amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."
Id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
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Nevertheless, it has been argued that there are at least two pos-
sible interpretations of Mapp, one of which is not inconsistent with a
freedom to significantly alter the exclusionary rule. 193 One possible
interpretation is that "the fourth amendment requires an effective
deterrent and that exclusion is conclusively presumed, as a matter of
constitutional law, to be that effective deterrent."' 94 But a second
possible interpretation is that the fourth amendment "requires an
effective deterrent, and that exclusion is the only (or the only ac-
ceptable) enforcement mechanism available to the Court."' 195 If this
interpretation is accepted, "then Congress [or the Court] by provid-
ing a substitute enforcement mechanism or by concluding through
fact-finding that historical circumstances have changed, would have
greater latitude to modify or eliminate the exclusionary rule."'196
There are several indications that the second interpretation is
the one that the Court has indeed accepted. First, this interpreta-
tion is implicit in the Court's reliance upon the deterrence ration-
ale. 197 The balancing approach advocated in United States v. Leon ' 98
requires that the Court ignore the exclusionary rule if admission
would have little or no effect on incentives to conduct unlawful
searches. For example, in Nix, the Court declined to apply the ex-
clusionary rule, finding that any possible reduction in deterrence
was outweighed by the "enormous societal cost of excluding
truth."'199 The Court also noted that substitute enforcement mecha-
nisms existed which lessened the likelihood that admission of the
evidence would promote police misconduct.200 Second, statements
made by the Court in subsequent decisions indicate that the second
interpretation has been adopted. In both Calandra and Leon, the
Court referred to the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created rem-
edy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect" on future unlawful police conduct.20 1
"Accordingly, '[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives





198 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See supra note 177 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Leon.
199 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984).
200 Id. at 446. "Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally-including the
possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability-also lessen the likelihood that
the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will promote police misconduct." Id.




are thought most efficaciously served.' "202
Thus, when weighing the effect on incentives to conduct war-
rantless searches against the social cost of releasing clearly guilty
defendants, the Court should be able to freely utilize the independ-
ent source, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis exceptions to
the extent permitted under the balancing test.
D. ASSURANCE OF INDEPENDENCE
The Court in Murray invoked the independent source doctrine,
finding that the doctrine is applicable when evidence is initially dis-
covered during a warrantless search, if that evidence is also discov-
ered during a later search conducted with a valid warrant.20 3 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court determined that the balancing
test20 4 can still be satisfied as long as the second search is com-
pletely independent of the initial, warrantless entry.20 5
In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority opinion, ar-
guing that it failed to provide for sufficient guarantees of indepen-
dence.206 Justice Marshall further argued that in order to ensure
genuine independence, such a finding must rest on" 'demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.' "207
Absent such facts, Justice Marshall asserted, independence cannot
be assured, and adequate deterrence against unlawful searches will
not be provided. 208
The dissent's proposed standard of proof is needlessly rigid. A
showing of such "demonstrated historical facts" need not be made
in order to ensure adequate deterrence against unlawful searches.
Instead, the Court should look to several factors in order to ensure
that a second, lawful search is indeed an independent source of the
evidence in question.
As the dissent argued, the initial inquiry should be whether
there are "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification
or impeachment" which show that the officers planned on obtaining
a valid warrant prior to the unlawful search, or that the evidence in
question inevitably would have been discovered regardless of the
202 Id. at 909 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
203 Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2531 (1988).
204 See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
205 108 S. Ct. at 2534. The Court stated that its holding in Murray would avoid the
cost of excluding probative evidence while still providing significant disincentives
against unlawful searches. Id. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445
n.5).
208 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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unlawful search. 20 9 For example, in Nix, there was clear evidence
that demonstrated that regardless of the officer's unlawful question-
ing of the defendant, an independent search party eventually would
have discovered the girl's body.210 If such a showing can be made,
then the evidence in question should clearly be admitted, despite
the unlawful conduct.2 1'
However, absent a showing of "demonstrated historical facts,"
a finding of independence can still be made. The Court should look
to the events leading to the unlawful search. The dissent argues
that the majority's decision is erroneous because it "makes the ap-
plication of the independent source exception turn entirely on an
evaluation of the officers' intent. '2 12 While the dissent is correct in
its assertion that a mere evaluation of the officers' intent would fail
to ensure genuine independence, it is incorrect in its conclusion that
the majority was basing its decision on such a narrow inquiry. In-
stead, Justice Scalia stated that "[t]o say that a district court must be
satisfied that a warrant would have been sought without the illegal
entry is not to give dispositive effect to the police officers' assur-
ances on the point. Where the facts render those assurances im-
plausible, the independent source doctrine will not apply."2 13
Thus, rather than relying solely upon the officers' statements that
they intended to obtain a warrant prior to the initial, warrantless
entry, the Court should also look to the facts surrounding those
assurances.
For example, in Murray, agents of the DEA had closely moni-
tored the activities of the defendants for almost one year prior to the
unlawful search. 214 The agents had received information from sev-
eral sources implicating the defendants in a conspiracy to possess
and distribute illegal drugs. 215 By the day of the search, the agents
had concluded that a major drug transaction was imminent.2 16
Based upon the sum of this information, the agents' statements that
they intended to obtain a warrant prior to the unlawful entry were
clearly not implausible. On the contrary, it seems much more im-
209 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210 467 U.S. at 448. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
211 Nrix, 467 U.S. at 444.
212 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2538 (Marshall J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that
"[ilt normally will be difficult for the trial court to verify, or the defendant to rebut, an
assertion by officers that they always intended to obtain a warrant .. ." Id. (Marshall,J,
dissenting).
213 Id. at 2534, n.2.





plausible that after spending nearly twelve months collecting infor-
mation, the agents did not intend to obtain a warrant to search the
warehouse. In fact, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
cluded that "[t]his is as clear a case as can be imagined where the
discovery of the contraband in plain view was totally irrelevant to
the later securing of a warrant and the successful search that
ensued." 217
In addition to the events leading to an unlawful search, the
Court should also inquire into the good faith of the officers con-
ducting such a search. Whether the fourth amendment violation
was deliberate is an important factor in exclusionary rule analysis
because exclusion of evidence discovered pursuant to a good faith
mistake will have little, if any, effect on deterrence of future viola-
tions.21s A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was
adopted by the Court in Leon.2 19
There, the Court held that application of the exclusionary rule
should continue when the fourth amendment violation has been
"substantial and deliberate. " 220 However, the balancing approach
that has evolved for determining whether the rule should be applied
in a variety of contexts suggests that the rule should be modified to
permit the introduction of evidence obtained by officers reasonably
relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. 22 1
This good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be
extended to include the admission of evidence obtained through an
unlawful search conducted by officers who reasonably believed that
217 Id. at 604. Despite the findings of the appellate court, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case, concluding that "it is the function of the District Court rather than the
Court of Appeals to determine the facts .... Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536.
218 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984).
219 Id. at 897. In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when
evidence is discovered during a search conducted by officers who reasonably believed
that they possessed a valid search warrant. Id. See supra note 177 for a discussion of
Leon.
220 Id. at 908-09.
221 Id. at 908. But see Schlag, supra note 155, at 895. Schlag argues against a good
faith test, stating that:
Excluding evidence seized illegally but in good faith serves to deter fourth amend-
ment violations insofar as it gives the law enforcement officer an incentive to engage
in learning. A good faith exception, by contrast, treats law enforcement knowledge
and application of fourth amendment law as afixed rather than a dynamic phenome-
non. Accordingly, such an exception makes sense only if a law enforcement officer
is incapable of expanding his knowledge and capacities. The good faith exception
necessarily focuses on the state of mind of the officer at the time of the violation,
and thus implies that if the officer acted in good faith at that time, no more could be
expected of him. Yet, if the law enforcement officer had engaged in greater learn-





there was a substantial likelihood of destruction of incriminating ev-
idence, when there was also an independent, lawful source of the
evidence. The Court in Murray seemed to make such an exten-
sion.222 Justice Scalia noted that the district court found that the
agents entered the warehouse " 'in an effort to apprehend any par-
ticipants who might have remained inside and to guard against the
destruction of possibly critical evidence.' "223 Justice Scalia further
argued that even if the agents "misjudged the existence of sufficient
exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry . . . there is
nothing to suggest that they went in merely to see if there was any-
thing worth getting a warrant for."'224
Such an extension of the good faith exception reinforces the
balancing test.225 By excluding evidence when the fourth amend-
ment violation is deliberate, further deterrence against unlawful
searches is provided. But, when the initial unlawful search was not
made merely to see if there was anything worth getting a warrant
for, admission of evidence discovered during a subsequent lawful
search would not provide incentives for future warrantless searches.
Instead, exclusion of such evidence "would put the police (and soci-
ety) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation
occurred, but in a worse one." 226
Thus, a showing of "demonstrated historical facts capable of
ready verification or impeachment" such as those in Nix is unneces-
sary. If the Court looks to the circumstances leading to a warrant-
less search, and the good faith of the officers conducting the search,
sufficient independence can be ensured to provide adequate deter-
rence against future violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
By substantially expanding the scope of the independent source
doctrine, Murray v. United States further eroded what remained of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Evidence discovered during
222 Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 (1988).
223 Id. at 2534-35 n.2 (quoting United States v. Carter, No. 83-102-S (D. Mass. Dec.
23, 1983)).
224 Id. at 2535, n.2. The facts in Murray clearly support this conclusion. There, the
DEA agents observed two trucks leave the warehouse. Id. at 2532. They had no way of
knowing whether anyone was left inside the warehouse. When it was determined that
the trucks contained controlled substances, the agents had valid reason to fear that if
they did not enter the warehouse someone in the warehouse would have the opportunity
to destroy any drugs inside.
225 See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
226 Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2535 (emphasis in original) (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
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an unlawful entry of private premises is now admissible when there
is also an independent, lawful source of the evidence.
Despite this seemingly radical extension from previous applica-
tions of the independent source doctrine, the Court's decision in
Murray was firmly grounded in the underlying principles of the ex-
clusionary rule. The Court's holding provides adequate assurance
of independence. Consequently, significant disincentives against
unlawful searches remain intact. While strengthening the power of
law enforcement officials to convict obviously guilty defendants, the
Murray Court did not sacrifice "those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embod-
iment in the fundamental law of the land." 22 7
BRADLEY C. GRAVELINE
227 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
1988] 675
